Robot Mindreading and the Problem of Trust by Páez, Andrés
Robot Mindreading and the Problem of Trust 
Andrés Páez1
Abstract. This paper raises three questions regarding the attribution 
of beliefs, desires, and intentions to robots. The first one is whether 
humans in fact engage in robot mindreading. If they do, this raises a 
second question: does robot mindreading foster trust towards 
robots? Both of these questions are empirical, and I show that the 
available evidence is insufficient to answer them. Now, if we assume 
that the answer to both questions is affirmative, a third and more 
important question arises: should developers and engineers promote 
robot mindreading in view of their stated goal of enhancing trans-
parency? My worry here is that by attempting to make robots more 
mind-readable, they are abandoning the project of understanding au-
tomatic decision processes. Features that enhance mind-readability 
are prone to make the factors that determine automatic decisions 
even more opaque than they already are. And current strategies to 
eliminate opacity do not enhance mind-readability. The last part of 
the paper discusses different ways to analyze this apparent trade-off 
and suggests that a possible solution must adopt tolerable degrees of 
opacity that depend on pragmatic factors connected to the level of 
trust required for the intended uses of the robot. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Autonomous Artificial Intelligent Systems (AISs) designed to inter-
act socially with humans are becoming a common presence in our 
private and public lives. Our increased interaction with personal vir-
tual assistants, social chatbots, autonomous vehicles and, especially, 
humanoid robots invites the question of how humans interpret, pre-
dict and explain their behavior and decisions. The interpretation 
framework adopted will have practical effects, such as facilitating 
human-robot interaction and cooperation, but it will also have phil-
osophical consequences. It will determine whether the AIS’s behav-
ior is judged to be conscious and free, and therefore subject to stand-
ards of legal and moral responsibility. The mental states attributed 
to AISs will also establish the rights they should be granted, and 
shape how humans assess the level of creativity, adaptability and 
potential for cooperation of an AIS. And more importantly for the 
purpose of this paper, the favored interpretative framework has im-
plications for the transparency and trustworthiness of AISs, two of 
the main concerns of software engineers committed to the EPSRC 
Principles of Robotics (Boden et al. 2017) and of philosophers in-
volved in the eXplainable AI project (XAI). Whether AISs are inter-
preted as intentional agents or as purely mechanic devices will affect 
the perception of transparency and the consequent level of trust 
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placed in them. This paper explores the relation between interpreta-
tive frameworks and their effects on our trust in AISs. 
I will use the expression robot mindreading to designate the atti-
tude of attributing mental states to AISs in order to explain and pre-
dict their decisions and actions.2 According to the conventional 
meaning of ‘mindreading’ (Nichols & Stich 2003), successful inter-
action with others involves the attribution of beliefs, desires, emo-
tions, and intentions to make sense of their behavior and predict their 
future actions. Many researchers have defended the idea that humans 
naturally engage in robot mindreading. For example, de Graaf and 
Malle argue that “systems that are in fact autonomous and intelligent 
will almost always exhibit some indicators of intentional agency 
(e.g., initiative, planning, decision making), and as soon as these in-
dicators lead people to actually regard them as intentional agents, 
people will apply the human conceptual framework of behavior ex-
planation to them” (2017, p. 19). 
However, the evidence for robot mindreading is not conclusive. 
Critics have questioned the idea of robot mindreading because of the 
self-report method used to evaluate the spontaneous attribution of 
mental states to robots (Scholl & Tremoulet 2000). Neuroimaging 
studies have also thrown doubts on the idea (Chaminade et al. 2012). 
The first task of the paper will thus be to examine the evidence and 
determine in which sense and to what extent humans engage in robot 
mindreading. This will be the topic of section 2. 
The main question I want to address, however, is whether devel-
opers and engineers should promote robot mindreading in view of 
their stated goal of enhancing transparency and trust. The question 
has an empirical component and a theoretical component. The em-
pirical component depends on the results of section 2: if humans sel-
dom engage in robot mindreading, it would be useless to promote 
mindreading as a means to generate trust. If they do so often, it is 
still a separate empirical question whether mindreading has the ef-
fect of creating trust. On the theoretical side, the question is whether 
transparency and mindreading-based trust are compatible goals in 
the case of robots. The risk is that by attempting to make AISs more 
mind-readable, we are abandoning the project of understanding au-
tomatic decision processes. Features that enhance mind-readability 
are prone to make the factors that determine automatic decisions 
even more opaque than they already are. And current strategies to 
eliminate opacity do not enhance mind-readability. The last part of 
the paper discusses different ways to analyze this apparent trade-off 
and suggests that a possible solution must adopt tolerable degrees of 
opacity that depend on pragmatic factors connected to the level of 
trust required for the intended uses of the AIS. 
2  In the literature on human-robot interaction it has become increasingly 
popular to talk about taking “the intentional stance” (Dennett 1987) to-
wards AISs. In the next section I explain why I prefer the more theoreti-
cally neutral term mindreading. 
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2 THE EVIDENCE FOR ROBOT MINDREADING 
 
Humans readily attribute mental states to other humans, to non-hu-
man animals (Mameli & Bortolotti 2006), and even to abstract 
shapes (Heider & Simmel 1944). It thus seems natural to assume that 
they also spontaneously attribute mental states to robots. This as-
sumption has been strengthened by recent developments in robot de-
sign that aim at facilitating meaningful interaction between robots 
and humans. The goal for many researchers in robotics is to create 
multimodal interfaces that closely mimic human appearance, behav-
ior and speech to provide social communicative functionality that is 
natural and intuitive (Duffy 2003). Social bots can now evaluate the 
emotional state of a human and adjust their behavior to build rapport 
and appear empathic (Novikova & Watts 2015). AISs can also ra-
tionalize their decisions by translating their internal state-action rep-
resentations into natural language (Ehsan et al. 2018). And we must 
not forget that humans have been primed by pop culture and science 
fiction to regard robots as autonomous intentional agents. 
Before we approach the question of whether humans in fact en-
gage in robot mindreading, it is important to examine two questions. 
The first one regards the nature of mindreading itself: What assump-
tions about human nature and what aspects of behavior and social 
interaction guide the attribution of a mental state to another person? 
This question is essential to robot mindreading because we need to 
be clear about our assumptions about the nature of AISs, and about 
the influence of pragmatic and social factors in the attribution of 
mental states to robots. The second question regards the experi-
mental evidence for human and robot mindreading. Can introspec-
tion give us a sufficient basis to understand how mindreading 
works? What does neuroimaging tell us about the interpretative 
framework adopted to interact with the subjects to which we attrib-
ute mental states? 
It has become increasingly popular to talk about taking “the in-
tentional stance” towards robots. The phrase, coined by Dennett 
(1987), is often left undefined in the human-robot interaction litera-
ture, so it is worth taking a closer look at its intended meaning. Ac-
cording to Dennett, taking the intentional stance towards x requires 
that we attribute to x the mental states that it would be rational for x 
to have given x’s behavior, context and needs. An initial problem for 
this normative characterization of mindreading is that it requires a 
robust meaning for ‘rationality’, and none has been forthcoming. 
Dennett himself settles for a “flexible” (p. 94) and “slippery” (p. 97) 
notion. But as Nichols and Stich argue, even if we reached a reason-
able construal of rationality, “a plausible case can be made that min-
dreading does not depend on an assumption of rationality” (1993, p. 
144). Mental states attributed to a person on the basis of his behavior 
can be explained by attributing an irrational desire to him. For ex-
ample, if Jones knows that doing a is detrimental to his well-being 
and he does it nonetheless, we can naturally explain his behavior by 
attributing to him a desire to do a, but that desire does not fit into a 
pattern of rationality. A similar case occurs with belief attribution. 
If Jones holds an irrational belief that results from a cognitive bias, 
his belief can be explained by attributing to him a thin grasp of the 
laws of logic or probability, but the explanation requires that we at-
tribute to him a certain degree of irrationality. Knowledge of the 
most common heuristics and biases can even allow us to predict the 
behavior of most people in solving simple tasks involving proba-
bilities. Finally, when an observer detects that an agent is being de-
ceitful in any way, the observer will attribute beliefs to the agent in 
ways that a rationality-based theory cannot explain (Eckman 1985). 
A defender of taking the intentional stance towards robots, of 
which there are many, could argue that robots are purposefully de-
signed to be rational and that the assumption of rationality is granted 
in this case. But that would only be true if current robots were de-
signed according to logical rules and saintly purposes. Present day 
AISs are based on a combination of several deep learning systems 
that can deviate from any watered-down notion of rationality and 
that inherit the biases of their trainers, as has been amply docu-
mented. There are also robots capable of deception and psychologi-
cal manipulation (Wagner & Arkin 2011). Although deception has 
evolutionary advantages for the deceiver, it would be excluded from 
any construal of rational behavior that includes an ethical compo-
nent. 
The idea of taking the “intentional stance” towards robots is at-
tractive because it offers a catch-all approach that simplifies our un-
derstanding of human-robot interaction. But fifty years of research 
in social cognition have shown that the concepts and mechanisms 
used to explain and predict human behavior can be as diverse as the 
behaviors themselves. They vary as a function of a person’s min-
dreading goals, and are affected by other aspects of social interac-
tion, such as social categorization, stereotypes, social biases, and sit-
uational context (Spaulding, 2018). This means that it is a mistake 
to try to adapt a global theory of human mindreading, be it the in-
tentional stance or any other, to robot mindreading. AISs have been 
designed for specific purposes, with specific human-like features, 
and with abilities that have been tailored for specific users. By con-
ducting research within these boundaries, it will be much easier to 
determine whether humans engage in robot mindreading, instead of 
pursuing strategies that promote a vaguely defined intentional 
stance. 
Let us turn now to the question of the experimental evidence for 
human and robot mindreading (see Pérez-Osorio & Wykowska 2019 
for a complete survey). Here we find two methodological problems. 
In many studies of human-robot interaction, the method used to 
evaluate the spontaneous attribution of mental states is based on self-
reports. This method has been criticized because it does not rule out 
the operation of other higher-order cognitive mechanisms. For 
example, participants might infer the attributions from the questions 
of the task rather than report perceived attributions (Sholl & 
Tremoulet 2000). A different approach is based on neuroimaging 
techniques that identify the neural mechanisms underlying 
mindreading. During the last 30 years, the physiological basis of 
mindreading has been detected by comparing brain imaging studies 
of people with autism, whose mindreading abilities seem to be faulty 
to varying degrees, with those of normal volunteers (Frith & Frith 
2000). However, these studies are still at a very early stage. They 
can only imperfectly detect which areas of the brain correspond to 
the ability to mindread, because not all social, linguistic, and emo-
tional behavior require this ability. More recently, researchers have 
tried to detect “on-line” mindreading in normal volunteers using 
different tasks involving goal-directed behavior, such as under-
standing a story that requires the attribution of desires and intentions 
to its characters (Fletcher et al. 1995), second-guessing an opponent 
in a game (Gallaher et al. 2002), and detecting stimuli that signal the 
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actions of another individual (Allison et al. 2000). Using these 
methods, a correlation between mindreading and activity in several 
brain regions has been claimed. The problem, again, is that this claim 
depends on the assumption that the subjects in these studies in fact 
are not using other higher-order mechanisms to perform the tasks. 
Despite these promising results, it must be said that the use of neu-
roimaging to understand mindreading is still in its infancy. 
Bearing in mind these methodological limitations, let us consider 
some of the evidence for and against robot mindreading based on 
neuroimaging. It has been shown that AISs elicit emotional re-
sponses and social behavior akin to those caused by other humans 
(Appel et al. 2012, Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al. 2014), and there 
is physiological evidence that humans can empathize with the per-
ceived pain of robots (Suzuki et al. 2015). There is also evidence 
that the degree of anthropomorphism and embodiment of AISs is 
positively correlated with the activation of brain regions associated 
with the inference of intentions, goals and desires in others (Hegel 
et al. 2008). More generally, anthropomorphism relies on the same 
cognitive mechanisms that generate the attribution of intentions to 
human behavior (Castelli et al. 2000). On the other hand, Krach et 
al. (2008) showed that areas of the brain previously shown to have 
been associated with mindreading were not activated in response to 
artificial agents regardless of their human-like appearance. And 
Chaminade et al. (2012) shows that in a rock-paper-scissors game, 
people’s brains react differently depending on whether they believe 
they are playing against a human or an AIS. In conclusion, the evi-
dence thus far for and against robot mindreading is unimpressive. If 
the study of human mindreading is its infancy, the study of robot 
mindreading is a research project waiting to be executed. 
 
3 ROBOT MINDREADING AND TRUST 
 
There is no doubt that the attribution of beliefs, desires and inten-
tions to an AIS facilitates human-robot interaction (Fong et al. 2003, 
Fink 2012). A gamer’s experience will be enhanced if she believes 
that her artificial opponent has (evil) intentions and desires, and a 
companion robot will better achieve its purpose if its owner believes 
that the robot actually cares about his woes. The general idea is that 
the cognitive and emotional response to robots will be more positive 
if the user treats it as an intentional agent. 
The first question I want to address is whether robot mindreading 
also fosters trust. I will assume in what follows that one of the main 
goals of robotics in particular, and of developers of AI in general, is 
to increase public trust towards artificial intelligent systems. Distrust 
in AISs can take different forms. One source of concern among the 
public is the danger posed by biased algorithms, which seem to gar-
ner much attention from the press. Governments and the private sec-
tor have taken strides to address the ethical challenges posed by AI 
because they are aware that public trust is essential for the consoli-
dation of the so-called 4th Industrial Revolution. A different source 
of concern is the perception that decisions made by an automatic 
system are not reliable, even when unbiased, and should not be 
trusted. Patients are reluctant to use health care provided by medical 
artificial intelligence even when it outperforms human doctors (Lon-
goni et al. 2019) and most people do not trust automated vehicles 
(Hutson 2017). In sum, there is a concern about the intended or 
unintended biases implanted in robots by their developers, and about 
their reliability and performance. 
In human-human interaction, honesty, competence and value 
similarity are essential to establish both cognitive and emotional 
trust (Gambetta 1991). Cognitive trust is based on one’s knowledge 
and evidence about the trustee, about his or her reliability, while 
emotional trust is based on the feelings generated by our interactions 
with others. Honesty, competence and value similarity can only be 
ascribed to others by attributing to them the adequate intentions and 
beliefs from which these traits can be inferred. Prima facie, then, 
enhancing traits that convey intentions and beliefs conducive to the 
creation of trust should be a goal of robotics. The initial question can 
now be restated in the following terms: Will people be more trustful 
towards an AIS if its decisions and behavior are seen as the result of 
mental states from which honesty, competence and value similarity 
can be inferred? Intuitively the answer should be affirmative. If a 
robot behaves in ways that resemble to a high degree those of a trust-
worthy human, and if the user makes sense of the AIS’s behavior by 
attributing mental states to it, there is no reason to believe that the 
user will not trust the AIS. 
The main problem with this answer is that it extrapolates the 
trust-building features of human relations to the field of robotics 
without having enough empirical support. A meta-analysis of factors 
affecting trust in human-robot interaction (Hancock et al. 2011) re-
vealed that “robot characteristics, and in particular, performance-
based factors, are the largest current influence on perceived trust in 
HRI” (p. 523). This finding is in line with the performance-based 
definitions of trust found in the literature on multi-agent systems 
(Witkowski et al 2001). 
Hancock et al. also found that factors related to human attitudes 
towards robots had a small role in trust building. The authors do not 
conclude that human factors have no influence on HRI. “Rather, the 
small number of studies found in this area suggests a strong need for 
future experimental efforts on human-related, as well as environ-
ment-related, factors” (p. 523). It could be argued that this meta-
analysis focused on cognitive trust, ignoring the fact that emotional 
trust is more likely to be detected as an effect of robot mindreading. 
There are in fact several studies about the emotional reaction of hu-
mans towards robots (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al. 2013), and 
there is anecdotal evidence of emotional attachments to robots 
(Klamer et al. 2011). However, none of these studies have measured 
emotional trust as an independent variable, so it is impossible to 
draw any conclusions about the relationship between mindreading 
and emotional trust. 
In sum, the empirical evidence for the trust-building effects of 
people’s attitudes towards robots, and in particular, of the interpre-
tative framework adopted towards them, is quite thin. I should add 
that in most cases humans are plainly aware that they are interacting 
with an artificial being that lacks intentions, consciousness, desires 
and free will. Despite attributing mental states to machines as an ex-
pedient means to predict and explain their behavior in certain con-
texts, humans are still able to identify true intentional systems. More 
importantly, momentary rapport and fluid interaction do not entail 
overall trust and understanding. Trust is not directed towards the in-
dividual decisions of an AIS but rather towards its global perfor-
mance. And the sense of understanding that arises from attributing 
mental states to an AIS can quickly disappear when the machine 
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behaves in unexpected ways. In sum, the answer to this question is 
as uncertain as the answer to the question discussed in the previous 
section. We do not know if humans in fact engage in robot mindread-
ing, or the specific circumstances in which they might do so, and 
neither can we say with any degree of certitude whether robot min-
dreading will foster trust towards AISs. 
 
4 ROBOT MINDREADING AND OPACITY 
 
Now, assume for a moment that robot mindreading in fact builds 
trust, i.e. that there are certain design features of robots that make it 
easier for people to attribute to them trust-conducive mental states. 
Working under this assumption we can now ask if the field of robot-
ics should work towards enhancing mindreading. The main reason 
for raising this question is that the problem of trust in AI systems has 
a flip side. According to many recent papers that advance the re-
search agenda of XAI (Ribeiro et al. 2016, Doshi-Velez & Kim 
2017, Samek et al. 2017, Gilpin et al. 2018, Guidotti et al. 2018, 
Edmonds et al. 2019, Páez 2019), to trust an AIS is to understand its 
actual decision-making process, to make it explainable, transparent, 
comprehensible and interpretable.3 Transparency and trust go hand 
in hand. The final question I want to address is whether this second 
source of trust is theoretically and practically compatible with the 
goal of promoting the attribution of trust-conducive mental states to 
robots. If they are not, which one should prevail? Is it possible to 
develop them in complimentary fashion? 
In many cases, the question of trust in AISs is not accompanied 
by a demand for transparency. For example, when the goal of a hu-
manoid robot is to provide emotional support, users need to feel that 
their social companion is empathic and understanding. Otherwise 
they will stop using it. This is a form of interaction that requires trust, 
in particular, trust in the judgments, perceptions and advice of the 
AIS, but it is unlikely that users will feel the need to know how these 
are reached. In fact, the AIS’s utility may be negatively affected by 
increased transparency (Wortham & Theodorou 2017). However, 
since many social robots are used in healthcare environments, pro-
viders and regulators will want to know whether the content that the 
AIS is transmitting to a patient, a child or a senior in a vulnerable 
emotional or physical condition promotes their emotional wellbeing 
and is not detrimental to their mental health. Thus, healthcare 
professionals will also seek transparency in the decision-making 
process of social robots. 
Furthermore, according to the 4th Principle of Robotics crafted 
by EPSRC and AHRC (Boden et al. 2017), 
 
Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not be designed 
in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead their ma-
chine nature should be transparent. … although it is permissible 
and even sometimes desirable for a robot to sometimes give the 
impression of real intelligence, anyone who owns or interacts 
with a robot should be able to find out what it really is and per-
haps what it was really manufactured to do (p. 127). 
 
 
3  Each of these terms has been fleshed out in different ways in the literature. 
I will use ‘transparency’ as a catch-all term for all of these variants. See 
Lipton (2018) for a comprehensive analysis. 
Is making robots more mindreadable a violation of this principle? Is 
mindreadability a kind of deception? The principle allows for robots 
that give the impression of real intelligence, but at the same time 
there must be a way to make their decision processes transparent. Is 
it possible to have it both ways? 
Although they both aim at trust-building, transparency and 
mind-readability are goals that pull in different directions. The pur-
pose of the addition of features that promote the attribution of beliefs 
and intentions to an AIS is to facilitate the kind of interaction and 
closeness that leads to emotional trust, and that allows the user to 
make sense of its decisions. But the search for an explanation for the 
decisions of an AIS aims at a different goal: to make sure that its 
decisions are warranted. Transparency generates what I will call ob-
jective trust in AISs (Witkowski & Pitt 2000, Tong et al. 2013). 
Chances are that in order to achieve one goal, developers will sacri-
fice the possibility of achieving the other. 
Robot systems are still in their infancy in terms of their ability to 
accurately explain their own behavior, especially when confronted 
with noisy sensory inputs and executing complex sequential deci-
sion processes (Edmonds et al. 2019). Attempts to explain a robot’s 
decisions and behavior using data-driven approaches are likely to 
fail given the noisy inputs (Anjomshoae et al. 2019), but the possi-
bility of designing a “transparent robot” is an ongoing research pro-
ject with some promising results (see below). 
However, the current trend in HRI is to design robots that offer 
natural language explanations that do not purport to represent their 
inner state or describe their sequential decision processes. Instead, 
the idea is to offer the explanation that a human would offer when 
performing a similar action. This idea has been labeled “explainable 
agency” (Langley et al. 2017).  
Consider two recent examples of this approach. Ehsan et al. 
(2018) introduce what they call “AI rationalization”: 
 
AI rationalization is a process of producing an explanation for 
agent behavior as if a human had performed the behavior. AI ra-
tionalization is based on the observation that there are times when 
humans may not have full conscious access to reasons for their 
behavior and consequently may not give explanations that liter-
ally reveal how a decision was made. In these situations, it is 
more likely that humans create plausible explanations on the spot 
when pressed (p. 81). 
 
There is no intention to make AI rationalizations an accurate repre-
sentation of the true decision-making process. Instead, rationaliza-
tion sacrifices accuracy for real-time responses, is more intuitive to 
non-expert humans and will generate higher degrees of satisfaction, 
confidence, rapport, and willingness to use autonomous systems. 
Hellström & Bensch (2018) defend a similar approach in which 
“understanding a robot” means having a successful interaction with 
it. And achieving a natural, efficient and safe interaction requires 
mindreading: 
 
Understanding of a robot is not limited to physical actions and 
intentions, but also includes entities such as desires, knowledge 
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and beliefs, emotions, perceptions, capabilities, and limitations of 
the robot. … Hence, we say that a human understands a robot if 
she has sufficient knowledge of the robot’s [state-of-mind] in or-
der to successfully interact with it. (pp. 115-116). 
 
A common assumption of both accounts is that robot mindread-
ing is useful to fulfill the intended purpose of the AIS. But usefulness 
is an interest-relative notion. Robot mindreading is not useful at all 
for a developer trying to debug or improve the reliability of a robot. 
Thus usefulness–or utility–is one of the keys to understanding the 
relation between transparency and mindreading. For some agents it 
is useful to tolerate a high degree of opacity; for some, it is not useful 
at all. 
The other key to the relation is risk. If robots are perceived as 
intentional agents, their actions have real effects on the psyche of its 
users, as we saw in the case of social robots used in healthcare envi-
ronments. This means that robot designers have a responsibility to-
wards vulnerable users of the robot that goes beyond the intended 
goal of providing companionship and entertainment. Their respon-
sibility is to guarantee to a reasonable degree that the actions of the 
robot will not be detrimental to the patients, and this can only be 
achieved by understanding the underlying decision processes. 
Thus, both dimensions have to be considered in robot design and 
implementation. A robot can fulfill the utility dimension to a very 
high degree while obtaining a high grade on a risk scale. What 
should the recommended course of action be? There is no algorithm 
that can help us decide which dimension should prevail. It depends 
on the kind of utility, the kind of risk, the needs of the users and the 
risk aversion of the people responsible for the implementation of the 
robot. Therefore, the resolution of the tension between mindreading 
and transparency is pragmatic through and through. 
Seen from another angle, the relation between mindreading and 
transparency has an ethical side. The rationalizations offered by a 
robot are, strictly speaking, a false account of its decision process, 
but they are offered to the user without disclaimer to make her inter-
action with the robot easier. In a sense, we have created lying robots. 
Should this disqualify them as morally worthy companions? Zerilli 
et al. (2019) have expressed their concern “that automated decision-
making is being held to an unrealistically high standard here, possi-
bly owing to an unrealistically high estimate of the degree of trans-
parency attainable from human decision-makers” (p. 661). Should 
we then tolerate the same level of insincerity that we find in human-
human interactions? 
The philosophy of testimony offers a possible answer to this 
question. According to the anti-reductionist position about testi-
mony, human communication would be impossible if we did not 
have a natural tendency to believe what other people say without 
demanding justification at every junction. In Tyler Burge’s words, 
“a person is a priori entitled to accept a proposition that is presented 
as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger rea-
sons not to do so” (1993, p. 469). Among the reasons to doubt a 
testimony are clear signs of insincerity or incompetence or both. A 
user interacting with a social robot could also claim a presumptive 
right (Fricker 1995) to believe the reasons it offers to explain its be-
havior, unless the reasons are perceived as obviously false or non-
sensical. 
But this answer is insufficient. In high-stakes situations, such as 
those encountered in law, finance or medicine, a user will demand 
that the reasons offered match the underlying decision processes. It 
will not be enough that the explanations offered make sense and 
seem true. In these areas, procedure, evidence, statutes, and prece-
dent are necessary elements of a satisfactory explanation. In the par-
lance of philosophers of testimony, the testimony has to be “re-
duced” or justified. Robots also have to make high-stakes decisions 
that require complex explanations not likely to be delivered in the 
form of friendly chatter or ready-made explanations. The use of real-
time graphical outputs to represent the internal states and decision-
making processes taking place within a robot seems to be a 
promising road to robot transparency (Wortham et al. 2017, Ed-
monds et al. 2019). This approach does not require the use of 
mindreading-friendly features. Quite the contrary. By making 
explicit the robot’s software hierarchical architecture, it makes it 
difficult to think of the robot as a being with human-like mental 
states. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many intuitions about our interaction with robots might turn out to 
be right, but it is important to verify them empirically. My first goal 
in this paper has been to call attention to the lack of empirical evi-
dence for human and robot mindreading and for its success as a trust-
building mechanism. Even if robot mindreading turns out to be an 
effective way to generate subjective trust, this goal has to be bal-
anced against other competing goals such as transparency and ob-
jective trust. There is no formula that can determine how to weigh 
these factors, and it is necessary to acknowledge that pragmatic fac-
tors will inevitably decide the way forward. 
I do not want to claim that transparency and subjective trust are 
incompatible in principle. Some authors remain confident that it is 
possible to create transparent robots that are nevertheless emotion-
ally engaging and useful tools across a wide range of domains 
(Wortham & Theodorou 2017). But it is important to recognize that 
mindreading and transparency are in tension and that there are 
practical, theoretical and philosophical obstacles that must be 
overcome before this tension can be resolved. 
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